

ISS 79-017

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

6 NOV 1979


Mr. Michael T. Blouin  
Director, Information Security  
Oversight Office  
General Services Administration (AT)  
18th & F Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20405

Dear Mr. <sup>Mike</sup>Blouin:

Forwarded herewith is the Agency's response to the one-time test report titled "Agency Information Security Program Data." As discussed between our staffs, the statistics in section "Id" of the report were obtained by actual count during 22-28 September and projected to cover the 1 May - 30 September 1979 reporting period.

I believe there are some statistics reported on the test report which are either unnecessary or meaningless. Since the form was approved by the Office of Management and Budget on an experimental basis subject to later review, I think it could be beneficial if you called a meeting of the major principals involved to discuss and review the report form.

Sincerely,

  
Chief, Information Services Staff  
Directorate of Administration

STATINTL

Enclosure

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - ISS Subject w/encl
- 1 - ISS Chrono
- 1 - RSB Subject w/encl (Class. Mgt/Reports to ISOO)
- 1 - RSB Chrono

ISS/RMD/RSB  (5 Nov 79)  
Rewritten:  (5 Nov 79)

STATINTL

AGENCY INFORMATION  
SECURITY PROGRAM DATA

1 May 1979

30 Sept. 1979

INTERAGENCY  
REPORT CONTROL  
NUMBER  
0213-GSA-OT

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY  
Central Intelligence Agency  
STAFF OFFICE  
Information Services Staff

CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (NAME) [REDACTED] STATINTL  
TELEPHONE NO. : [REDACTED] STATINTL

1. CLASSIFICATION				
ITEM	TOP SECRET (a)	SECRET (b)	CONFIDENTIAL (c)	UNCLASSIFIED (d)
a. Number of original classification authorities	474	1171	19	
b. Estimated number of personnel authorized to apply derivative markings.	No Figure (ISOO Waiver)			
c. Number of current classification guides		3	1	

d. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS		ORIGINAL		DERIVATIVE MARKINGS (c)		
		0 - 6 YEARS (a)	OVER 6 - UP TO 20 (b)			
Top Secret		0	1,421	58,366		
Secret		1,312	17,903	368,407		
Confidential		5,946	58,547	61,367		
e. Extended beyond 20 years	TOP SECRET (1)		SECRET (2)		CONFIDENTIAL (3)	
	PAGES	CUBIC FEET	PAGES	CUBIC FEET	PAGES	CUBIC FEET
	16,620	8.3	10,482	5.2	258,709	129.3

2. DECLASSIFICATION												
ITEM	CASES FOR WHICH AGENCY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FINAL DECISION									CASES FOR WHICH AGENCY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR FINAL DECISION		
	CASES CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS PERIOD	NEW CASES RECEIVED	TOTAL PAGES REVIEWED (ESTIMATE)	DECISION TO DECLASSIFY			CASES REQUIRING OVER 60 DAYS FOR ACTION	CASES REQUIRING OVER 30 DAYS FOR ACTION	CASES CARRIED OVER TO NEXT PERIOD	FORWARDED TO ANOTHER AGENCY FOR FINAL ACTION	RECEIVED FROM ANOTHER AGENCY FOR OPINION ONLY	RETURNED TO REQUESTOR FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION
	(a)	(b)	(c)	GRANTED IN FULL	GRANTED IN PART	DEFERRED	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUESTS	308 <del>299</del>	56 <del>57</del>	1750	22 <del>12</del>	25 <del>23</del>	13	56		304	2	0 <del>12</del>	0
MANDATORY REVIEW APPEALS	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	

c. NUMBER OF OFFICIALS GRANTED DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	NUMBER 48
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3. AGENCY ACTIONS TO VITIOR IMPLEMENT					
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP85B00236R00020015001152 08 U					
a. NUMBER OF FORMAL INSPECTIONS, SURVEYS, OR PROGRAM REVIEWS CONDUCTED <b>3</b>					
b. INSTANCES OF CLASSIFICATION VIOLATIONS DETECTED INVOLVING:					
(1) OVERCLASSIFICATION	(2) UNNECESSARY CLASSIFICATION	(3) CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY	(4) UNDERCLASSIFICATION	(5) EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY	
0	0	0	0	0	
c. INSTANCES OF SAFEGUARDING INFRACTIONS DETECTED INVOLVING:					
(1) ACCESS	(2) MARKING	(3) TRANSMISSION	(4) STORAGE	(5) DESTRUCTION	(6) REPRODUCTION
81	0	4	118	0	0
d. CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS					
a. INCLUDED IN INVENTORY (ACTUAL) <b>126,237</b>			b. EXCLUDED FROM INVENTORY (ESTIMATED) <b>TS Codeword (No estimate)</b>		
e. NARRATIVE REPORT (COMMENT ON EACH OF THE ITEMS LISTED BELOW. MAKE ANSWERS AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE. ATTACH EXHIBITS OR CONTINUATION AS REQUIRED.)					
a) DESCRIBE EFFORTS TO DECLASSIFY INFORMATION UNDER THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW PROCEDURES OF THE ORDER. During the period 1 May - 30 Sep 1979, 2.7 cu. ft. (5,376 pp.) of material was declassified. This figure, together with the volume listed in Sec. 1e, and projected on an annual basis, represents approximately 3.1% of the estimated volume of 20 year-old materials to be reviewed by 1 Dec. 1988. This percentage of completion should increase as increasing proficiency is attained in all aspects of the systematic review function. A new component has been (CONT'D)					
b) DESCRIBE EFFORTS TO INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION DECLASSIFIED 198 cu. ft. of declassified OSS files, part of a larger collection, have been offered to NARS. A large body of [REDACTED] materials was released to NARS prior to this reporting period. Additionally, the CIA routinely provides Carrollton Press, Inc., with copies of documents declassified or sanitized as the result of mandatory classification review actions. (CONT'D)					
c) DESCRIBE EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL GENERATED To permit a less restricted flow of communications as well as for security reasons, individuals are encouraged, through training programs and records management practices, to prepare correspondence where possible in a manner that will not require national security classification.					
d) DESCRIBE ACTIONS TAKEN TO LIMIT CLASSIFICATION TO 6 YEARS Experience has demonstrated that classified information produced by the CIA usually requires protection for more than six years in order to protect intelligence sources and methods. Through the use of classification guides, however, those types of information that do not require extended protection are identified and classification durations are limited to six years or less.					
e) DESCRIBE EXTENT OF USE OF THE BALANCING TEST (E.O. 12065, SECTION 3-3(c)). Nothing to report at this time.					
f) DESCRIBE ACTIONS TO ENHANCE SAFEGUARDS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION					
1. Established internal audit program to monitor document control procedures. 2. Responded to a number of requests from non-NFIB agencies and Congressional delegations for specialized security briefings and special access program re-indoctrinations. 3. Assigned four professional security officers to area divisions for on-scene security support. (CONT'D)					
g) DESCRIBE MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTING E.O. 12065 AND ISCO DIRECTIVES The total burden of compliance, requiring the diversion of scarce resources required to implement the Order, both initially and in meeting the 10-year re-review requirement; the hazards to national security inherent in the unavoidable piecemeal review of classified material whose sensitivity in the aggregate may become apparent only after a large body of material has been reviewed and declassified; the Order's failure to address the (CONT'D)					
AUTHENTIC [REDACTED] G I A L (TYPED NAME AND TITLE, AND SIGNATURE) DATE					
STATINTL [REDACTED]			Chief, Information Services Staff, DDA		
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150011-5			6 NOV 1979		
STANDARD FORM 311 (TEST) BACK APRIL 1979 EDITION					

NARRATIVE REPORT

- A) created within the Agency, staffed with individuals with a mix of disciplines and backgrounds, and with the specific mission of implementing the systematic review provisions of the Order. Internal procedures have been adopted and an ADP system developed for recording review actions.
- B) Carrollton Press, a commercial service, indexes the documents and microfilms them. The indices and microfiche are available to the public on a subscription basis and thus an individual can find out about what has been declassified by the CIA through a visit to a subscribing library.
- E)
  - 4. Began systematic program to replace obsolete safes.
  - 5. A complete review of Agency's Visitor-No-Escort badge program was accomplished.
  - 6. Increased investigative coverage for Secret level industrial clearances.
- G) review of classified material produced by inter-departmental committees, and the failure to address non-paper copy classified materials, all of which present unique problems in the review process. There are difficulties in establishing procedures to reconcile accountability requirements of ISOO directives, such as annual inventories and document control, with the realities of the enormous volume of classified material the CIA handles.